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SUMMARY
The purpose of this paper has been to in-
vestigate the extent to which food aid can
contribute to reducing undernourishment
in the world. The three chapters each high-
light the complexity of the problem. Analy-
sis is hampered by serious methodological
and data problems.
First, the definition of food aid is un-
clear: the classification into three types,
used in virtually all publications, does not
account for important food-security aspects
of food-aid operations. For example, project
food aid, though assumed to have been dis-
tributed among beneficiaries, may be sold
instead, so limiting its direct effects on food
security. The increasingly complex flows of
food-aid transactions can hardly be catego-
rized at all into the three broad types of food
aid used by the World Food Programme
Statistical Department.
Secondly, food aid has been found to
have various unpredictable economic and
food-security effects. It is impossible to
draw general conclusions about how food
aid in the field should be managed. Each
operation proves to be specific and special
in many ways.
Nevertheless, in spite of the serious
methodological problems, food aid in the
1990s was tied increasingly to the concept
of food security. The idea that food aid,
which is becoming a scarce resource,
should be targeted better towards countries
with the highest prevalence of undernour-
ishment and contribute more to food secu-
rity in recipient countries has been empha-
sized increasingly in international docu-
ments. On the other hand, there is little
concern with what food aid ‘is’ in practice.
It is not just the definition of food aid
that has been problematic, but the meas-
urement of undernourishment and hunger,
which has proved virtually impossible on a
macro level. Both the macro models briefly
described in Chapter 2 of the paper suffer
from methodological problems. The FAO
method, based on ‘average calorie con-
sumption’ and hypothetical individual cut-
off points, has recently been found to be
extremely sensitive to minor modifications
in the data. Anthropometric surveys also
have serious limitations and are available
only for children under the age of five.
In spite of the above limitations,
Chapter 3 of the paper attempts to compare
food aid and undernourishment. Global
food-aid deliveries could contribute to na-
tional food security in developing countries,
if more food aid were provided when agri-
cultural prices were high, in other words if
there was an inverse relationship between
the level of food aid and wheat prices. This
has not been found to be the case. A simple
comparison of the top ten recipients of food
aid and the prevalence of undernourish-
ment in countries reveals that the countries
receiving the most food aid have not been
the ones with the highest levels of under-
nourishment.
Finally, it can be concluded that food
aid, for most countries, makes up only a tiny
proportion of national food availability, so
that significant long-term food-security ef-
fects cannot be expected. This does not
mean that aid in kind cannot have positive
nutritional effects in emergencies or in
countries where food is the binding con-
straint on development. In fact, food aid
should be analysed more closely on the mi-
cro (household and village) level and the
opinions of beneficiaries solicited and con-
sidered when planning and designing food-
aid operations. Although macro-level
analysis does not demonstrate the food-
security aspect of food aid, the micro level
may well do so, but this needs to be con-
ducted for each separate food-aid pro-
gramme.
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The expression ‘food aid’ in everyday life
may remind people of the huge trucks
sometimes seen on television delivering ‘free
food’ to ‘hungry people’, to help them sur-
vive an emergency. Deeply touched by the
immense suffering of such destitute people,
we may stop for a moment to remind our-
selves how lucky we are not to be among
them. The impression is also gained that the
international community is trying to help
and acting to the best of its ability. Periodi-
cally, there is news of conventions, declara-
tions, commitments and promises to ‘make
it a better world’, and every year billions of
dollars are donated to needy countries in
the form of aid. Recently, 2015 had been set
as a ‘UN target year’ for global reduction of
undernourishment and other goals. The
heads of state signing the commitment in
1996 at the World Food Summit undertook
to ‘reduce the number of undernourished
people to half, at the latest by 2015.’
But what is meant by ‘reducing’ un-
dernourishment? Could food aid, under
current circumstances, play any role in this
process? What does ‘food aid’ mean in real-
ity? Is it really ‘edible commodities donated
to needy populations’, as the Food Aid Lexi-
con defines it?
This paper attempts to address the
extremely sensitive and sometimes political
question of what role food aid can play in
reducing global undernourishment and
how food aid can contribute to food secu-
rity. Food aid, during its history, has been
analysed and hotly debated for its possible
negative effects on prices, production and
agricultural trade. However, the idea of
joining food aid with food security has been
triggered quite recently by changes in world
agricultural trade and production in the
1990s.
Over the last decade, food aid has be-
come a scarce resource that has lost its basis
and impetus. Whereas world agricultural
trade in the 1990s was increasingly liber-
alized, food aid remained an implicit export
subsidy in market-oriented agricultural
trade. Agricultural surpluses, export-import
subsidies, price regulations and import bar-
riers were the pillars of the international
food-aid system set up in the early 1950s
and these institutions are no longer ‘toler-
ated’ in an agricultural trade system deter-
mined by short-term fluctuations in supply
and demand. Recognition of the changing
environment of food aid, as well as its scar-
city and cost-inefficiency, has turned the
attention of analysts from the ‘traditional’
production-price debate towards the food-
security aspect of food aid. This shift to-
wards the ‘humanitarian’ aspect of food aid
has been re-enforced by the World Food
Summit in 1996 and the Millennium De-
velopment Goals of reducing worldwide
undernourishment. Recent international
documents emphasized, ‘Food aid is one of
the many instruments which can help to
promote food security’ (World Food Sum-
mit, 1996). ‘Food aid… should be aimed at
enhancing food security in recipient coun-
tries’ (Food Aid Convention, 1999). ‘The
objectives of the food-aid operations… shall
be to promote food security geared to allevi-
ating poverty’ (EC Council Regulation on
Food Aid, 1996). ‘USAID will allocate re-
sources and manage programs to increase
the impact US food aid has in reducing
hunger’ (USAID Food Aid and Food Security
Policy Paper, 1995).1
This brings us back to the starting
point. Can food aid play a role in reducing
global undernourishment? In other words,
can food aid contribute to food security?
Chapter 1 clarifies some problems of
definition and surveys briefly the history
and current trends in food aid. Chapter 2
addresses the problem of ‘food security’ and
the conceptual, measurement and theoreti-
cal problems it presents. Chapter 3 bridges
the previous two chapters by analysing
whether food aid can, even in theory, affect
                                                
1 See Appendix 1 for other extracts from these
documents.
6food security and play a role in reducing
undernourishment.
1) FOOD AID: DEFINITION,
HISTORY AND TRENDS
Defining food aid
It is by no means easy to say what is meant
by food aid or how food aid ‘works’ in
practice. There are several aspects of food
aid, which can be categorized according to
various criteria. This section aims to clarify
the main problems of defining food aid and
show that it does not fall into a single cate-
gory.
Food aid in its most general form can
be defined as ‘some kind of agricultural
commodity financed by a donor and ulti-
mately used in a recipient country.’ Issues
that are usually taken for granted in the
‘conventional’ definitions of food aid, such
as ‘edible commodities’, ‘distributed free’ or
‘donated to poor countries’ are not part of
this general definition or necessarily true.
Food aid in general can be categorized
according to several aspects or characteris-
tics of any food-aid programme:
(1) Terms of delivery: on what terms is the
food aid provided to the recipient by the
donor country?
(2) Procurement: how are the commodities
procured, i.e. where does the shipment
come from?
(3) Sold or distributed: what is the fate of
the commodities in the recipient coun-
try?
(1) Food aid can be given either as a grant
(donation) or a concessionary sale/loan.
The reason why concessionary sales are
considered ‘food aid’ and not normal ‘com-
mercial transactions’ is because the terms of
delivery are more favourable than those on
prevailing market conditions. The repay-
ment period is usually longer, interest rates
are lower, or the price may simply be lower
than on the open market. When food aid is
provided on concessionary terms, it is re-
payable by the recipient government either
in kind or in cash over a stipulated repay-
ment period (usually 10–15 years). Grants
of food aid do not have to be repaid and are
usually targeted at specific groups of peo-
ple.
It should be emphasized that food aid
is not necessarily free to the recipient gov-
ernment. Food aid delivered in the past on
concessionary terms has either been repaid
by the recipient government (10–15 years
later, at the end of the repayment period),
or more commonly, has become part of the
recipient country’s overall debt, still await-
ing repayment.
(2) There are various ways that food aid can
get into a recipient country, the most ‘con-
ventional’ being direct transfer, when food
aid is delivered directly from the donor to
the recipient country. A more complicated
form of providing food aid is triangular
purchase, whereby the donor finances the
purchase of a commodity in another (devel-
oping) country, which is then transferred to
the recipient country. The third way of pro-
viding food aid is simply to provide cash for
local purchase of the commodity: food aid,
in which case it is procured in the ‘hungry’
country and (usually) redistributed among
beneficiaries. This way of providing food
aid may be the most beneficial to local agri-
cultural producers (providing a buyer for
their output), but it is the most problematic
in terms of justifying a food-aid programme
with the argument of ‘inadequate food sup-
plies’ in the recipient country. If the food
aid is procured locally, there is no macro
increase in food supply, simply a redistri-
bution, which could, theoretically, take
place without the involvement of interna-
tional food aid. Nevertheless, the economic
effects of these three types of food aid
should be considered when evaluating food
aid from a food-security point of view.
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has been procured, let us now suppose that
the agricultural commodity is finally in the
recipient country. Following the ‘conven-
tional’ definition of food aid, it would be
reasonable to expect it to be distributed
among beneficiaries; but this may be far
from the fact. Food aid may be sold on the
open market, at prevailing market prices, or
in ‘fair-price shops’, as it is, for instance, in
India. Alternatively, it may be distributed
for some kind of recompense, as it is under
a food-for-work programme, or it may be
distributed free among the beneficiaries.
Selling food aid raises many problems. One
can justifiably ask why an agricultural trade
transaction should be considered as food aid
if it is not in fact food aid at the beneficiary
level, because people are buying the com-
modities on the open market at prevailing
prices (just as they would local produce or
commercial imports). This issue is consid-
ered in more detail later.
Further problems with the ‘generali-
zation’ of food aid into a single category
arise. From the food-security aspect, it is
important to know the type of commodity
that has been delivered (is it ready for hu-
man consumption?), when the shipment
arrived (compared with the production cy-
cle, it may have arrived at harvest time,
when it is more likely to have a negative
effect on local agricultural production and
trade.) In addition, it is important to know
the channel through which the food aid
arrived. Was it an NGO, was it provided
bilaterally, or did it come through a
multilateral channel such as the World Food
Programme?
Over the years, it has become harder
to classify food aid into major categories
that bring all the issues just mentioned into
a single framework. The primary source of
data about food aid is the International Food
Aid Information System (INTERFAIS)
maintained by the World Food Programme,
which categorizes food aid into three main
groups:
1. Relief (emergency) food aid: targeted and
freely distributed to victims of natural or
man-made disasters.
2. Project food aid: distributed to targeted
beneficiary groups to support specific
development and disaster-prevention ac-
tivities. Part (or all) of such project food
aid may be monetized to generate local
currency to cover transport and handling
costs.
3. Programme food aid, usually supplied as
a resource transfer for balance of pay-
ments or budgetary-support objectives. It
is provided as a grant or a loan on a bi-
lateral basis. Unlike the food aid pro-
vided for project or relief purposes, it is
not targeted at specific beneficiary
groups, but sold on the market in the re-
cipient country.
These three broad categories incor-
porate in some form the issues just dis-
cussed, although the three types inevitably
overlap and generalize the determinants of
food aid. Figure 1 shows the relationship
between the different definitions of food aid.
The original definition of food aid was
produced by the FAO in 1954, under the
title Principles of Surplus Disposal. This de-
fined 13 transactions as food aid, including
sales on credit, loans repayable in kind, and
monetary grants tied to the purchase of spe-
cific commodities (see Appendix 1). Even
the most widely used and accepted INTER-
FAIS database simplifies the problem by
lumping together these transactions into
three broad categories. The question of
what does not constitute food aid also arises.
The World Bank in 1992–3 financed
drought-related maize imports by making
an International Development Association
(IDA) Emergency Recovery Loan, with the
Maize Marketing Board required to tender
openly for each import contract under IDA
procurement rules. FAO and WFP do not
class such transactions as food aid.
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used for the INTERFAIS database cannot
cover all the aspects of the various food-aid
programmes. The distinction between
emergency, project and programme food
aid, widely drawn in studies about food aid,
does not say whether the food aid has been
provided free or on concessionary terms, or
how it has been procured. Furthermore, it
gives an unsatisfactory response to the
question of whether the food aid has been
sold or distributed. Programme food aid is
always sold on the market, but project food
aid (in part or total) may also be monetized,
so that the food aid sold on the market em-
braces not only programme food aid, but
some project food aid as well. Ultimately,
therefore, what is the difference between
programme food aid and project food aid?
Programme food aid is always sold on
the market and provided bilaterally, on a
government-to-government basis. It is han-
dled by the recipient government or its
agent and the primary motive is to provide
balance-of-payments or budgetary support
to the recipient country. The revenue from
sales is accumulated in so-called local-
currency counterpart funds that can be
used for development purposes. Monetized
project food aid is also sold on the market at
prevailing market prices, but it is handled
by NGOs and the
revenue obtained is
not used for budg-
etary support or
accumulated in
special funds: it
goes entirely for
project support, to
provide cash to im-
plement the project.
How significant
these categories are
statistically will be
discussed in the
following section.
Non-monetized
project food aid
programmes in-
clude food-for-
work (FFW) pro-
grammes, vulner-
able-group feeding (VGF), school feeding
(SF), etc.
There are several problems with the
idea of selling food aid on the market, espe-
cially with NGOs monetizing project food
aid:
* The poorest do not benefit directly from
the food aid, although they may indi-
rectly, if the revenues from the counter-
part funds are channelled to the region
to finance development. However, there
is a mismatch between the food-security
component of food aid and the fact that it
is sold on the market.
* The various market effects of such sales
should be taken into account. There is no
general rule about where, how and when
the commodities should be sold, so that it
cannot be assured a priori that the
monetization will not affect agricultural
markets. (In fact, this question has been
at the core of the debate on food aid over
the years.) Most people in the developing
world live in rural areas and work in
agriculture, as subsistence farmers with
some cash cropping or as wage labourers
on estates. The injection of programme
food aid into local markets may have
widespread and serious detrimental ef-
Figure 1
Food aid from donor to recipient country
Donor
country
Recipient
country
Terms of delivery:
Concessionary sale
or grant?
Procurement:
1. Direct Transfer
2. Triangular Purchase
3. Local Purchase
Sold
Distributed:
to government, bilaterally
(government or its agent sells
on open market):
 PROGRAMME FOOD AID
to NGOs/PVOs
(NGO sells at open-market
prices):
PROJECT FOOD AID
to NGOs / PVOs / WFP
(NGO distributes it):
PROJECT FOOD AID
to NGOs/PVOs/WFP
(usually free): EMERGENCY
FOOD AID
Source: Clay and Stokke, 2000.
9fects if it tips the balance of supply and
demand on rural agricultural markets.
The history of food aid
The first food-aid operations started in the
early 1950s and were provided mainly by
the United States. When US Public Law 480
was passed in 1954, the food-aid pro-
gramme was tied intimately to national ag-
ricultural policy (see Box). Government
surpluses, the result of commodity-support
programmes, provided the grain for food
aid and the basis for support among farmers
and agricultural organizations. US farm
welfare was directly linked to food aid
(Christensen, 2000). Thus the primary ra-
tionale for providing food aid has never
really been food security as such and the
first food aid programmes had various ad-
ditional political, economic and military
motivations. Food aid played an important
role in increasing US agricultural trade, as
countries that had once been food-aid re-
cipients went on to become commercial
customers. Substantial proportions of food
aid were programme food aid: direct trans-
fers of commodities provided bilaterally
(through government-to-government ne-
gotiations) and sold on the markets of re-
cipient countries.
Other donors became involved in food
aid in the 1960s. Subsequently, an institu-
tional system was built up for managing
food-aid operations.
Institutional arrangements for food
aid
The institutional arrange-
ments that regulate food-aid
donations did not change
substantially in the 1990s,
despite several major
changes in international af-
fairs. The World Food Pro-
gramme was set up in 1963 as a UN agency
within the FAO. The first Food Aid Conven-
tion (FAC) was agreed in 1967 and has
been renegotiated several times since. Sig-
natories legally committed themselves to
provide specified minimum tonnages of
food aid in wheat equivalent. Historically,
the principal objective has been to provide a
safety net for recipient countries against
downward fluctuations in food aid. Table 1
shows the minimum commitments under
past Food Aid Conventions.
The US Food Aid Programme
1. PL480 (Food For Peace Programme)
a. Title I: Trade and development assistance
Government-to-government concessionary-sales
programme administered by USDA. The loans offer
terms of 10 to 30 years with a 7-year grace period
and low rates of interest.
b. Title II: Emergency and private assistance grant
programme administered by USAID. Provides food
aid for emergency purposes, but also for non-
emergency purposes through PVOs, cooperatives and
international agencies (WFP). Commodities supplied
may be monetized.
c. Title III: Food for development
Multi-year bilateral grant programme to provide
economic development and food security, also ad-
ministered by USAID. The food aid may be sold, with
the CPFs generated used for development activities.
2. Section 416 (of the Agricultural Trade Act 1949)
Grant programme administered by USDA entailing
donations of surplus food, acquired by the Commod-
ity Credit Corporation (CCC), to developing coun-
tries.
3. Food-for-Progress Programme
Independently authorized, usually grant-aid pro-
gramme that uses commodities, Title I funds or CCC
funds in support of countries that have made com-
mitments to introduce or expand free-enterprise ele-
ments in their agricultural economies.
4. Food Security Commodity Reserve
A reserve of 4 million t of cereals created in 1980 to
help fulfil PL480 commitments, where US supplies
were short, or to meet unexpected emergency needs.
Source: Clay and Stokke (2000).
Table 1
Minimum commitments under the Food Aid Conventions
(million t)
Convention 1967 1971 1980 1986 1995 1999
Aggregate
minimum
commitment
4.3 4.2 7.6 7.5 5.4 4.9
Source: Benson (2000).
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The latest, 1999 FAC stipulated for the
first time that ‘food aid…provided in the
form of grants shall represent not less than
80 per cent of a member’s contribution.’
Recent analysis of the efficacy of the Food
Aid Convention in providing a stable level
of food aid (Benson, 2000) has revealed se-
rious shortcomings: dips in food-aid ship-
ments following poorer harvests in donor
countries have not been prevented. The
minimum food-aid flows have been set so
low by the FAC that they have a negligible
impact on actual shipments. The FAO Con-
sultative Sub-Committee on Surplus Dis-
posal (CSSD) has monitored food aid since
the early 1960s to ensure that food-aid
principles are not violated.
The World Trade Organization
(WTO) is responsible for monitoring the
follow-up to the 1994 Marrakesh Decision
under the Uruguay Round Agreement,
which embodies commitment to assist de-
veloping countries affected by trade liber-
alization.
Changes in the 1990s
The last decade has seen several major in-
ternational changes with an impact on food
aid.
The impetus behind food-aid pro-
grammes and the rationale for providing
aid in the form of commodities rather than
cash were provided until the 1990s by the
huge agricultural surpluses that existed in
major food-exporting developed countries,
notably the United States and the EC coun-
tries. Due to the liberalization process in
internal agricultural markets (in the US and
the EU) and international agricultural trade
(the Uruguay Round), these surpluses have
dwindled, so that food aid, instead of being
surplus driven, has become increasingly
budget driven, a scarce resource. The
changed environment in which food aid is
funded and organized is marked by a
stronger market orientation in agriculture
and by budgetary constraints.
The political and military motives be-
hind food aid changed with the collapse of
the Soviet Union. The inclusion of the for-
mer Soviet countries in the list of eligible
recipients greatly increased the global de-
mand for food aid, as did the surge in
natural and man-made disasters in the
1990s.
Since the second half of the decade,
the food-security role of food-aid pro-
grammes has been placed to the fore in
some important international documents:
the World Food Summit, the 1999 Food Aid
Convention, and policy papers by major do-
nors such as United States and the EU.
(Quotations from these appear in Appendix
2.) A gulf can be seen between the desired
(and increasingly emphasized) ‘food-
security effect’ of food-aid programmes and
the actual contribution they make to food
security. The recent international docu-
ments just mentioned treat food aid as a
single category, without distinguishing
among the different types of food aid and
ignoring the fact that an analysis of the
food-security aspect calls for a classification
of food-aid operations according to the pro-
portion of them distributed among benefici-
aries. Given the complex definition of food
aid, it is clear that a high proportion of food
aid never gets distributed to the intended
beneficiaries, so that it does not have any
direct effect on local or national food secu-
rity. Although the 1999 Food Aid Conven-
tion requires that 80 per cent of the global
food-aid deliveries be donated, that still
does not mean the food aid is actually dis-
tributed among the poor. In many cases it is
sold on the market instead.
Surprisingly, there is no methodology
or indicator for focusing on the food-
security effect of food aid. Still, 11 million
tonnes of food aid (in grain equivalent)
were delivered in 2000, with slight macro
targeting towards LIFDCs and questionable
micro targeting to actual, deserving benefi-
ciaries.
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Food aid in statistics
The problems of definition mentioned in the
first section make it hard to analyse food-
aid statistics. Agencies responsible for re-
porting food aid2 define food aid in various
ways, so that the estimates differ widely.
The best course is therefore to stick to one
source of data. The choice here is the World
Food Programme INTERFAIS database, with
all statistics converted into grain equivalents
(tonnes).
Global food-aid deliveries
Global food-aid deliveries in the 1990s
show a rather predictable fluctuation: after
1993, there was a sharp decline in global
deliveries, due mainly to a significant de-
crease in US donations. The decline is partly
attributed to the Uruguay Round agree-
ments which involved agriculture into the
global trade liberalization process. This de-
crease was seen as a food-aid crisis – it was
widely believed that the history of food aid
was over. However, the year 1999 saw a
huge, almost two-fold increase in global
deliveries (Table 2, Figure 2).
Table 2
Global food-aid deliveries
(’000 t)
1990 13.1
1991 12.8
1992 15.3
1993 17.3
1994 12.9
1995 10.2
1996 7.2
1997 7.4
1998 8.4
1999 15.0
2000 10.9
Source: WFP INTERFAIS.
                                                
2 Among which the most important ones are: World
Food Programme International Food Aid Information
System (WFP INTERFAIS), FAO, OECD / DAC (De-
velopment Assistance Committee).
Food aid by type of programme
Disaggregating the global INTERFAIS statis-
tics into the three main types of pro-
grammes reveals an interesting picture (Ta-
ble 3, Figure 3). The steep decline after
1994 was due to a reduction in programme
food aid, whereas emergency and project
food aid were relatively stable over the dec-
ade. Programme food aid also accounted for
the jump in global food aid in 1999.
Table 3
Food-aid deliveries broken down by type of
programme
(thousand MT)
Emergency Project Programme Total
1990 2042 2664 8446 13151
1991 3366 2717 6636 12719
1992 5033 2570 7699 15302
1993 4257 2506 10571 17334
1994 4553 2718 5656 12926
1995 3697 2314 4192 10203
1996 2662 1706 2860 7228
1997 3265 2282 1774 7322
1998 2984 2513 2878 8375
1999 4557 2345 8084 14985
2000 5483 2677 3178 11339
2001 5510 2779 2723 11012
Source: WFP INTERFAIS
The increasing use of food aid for
emergencies reflects not only natural disas-
ters, but also the rising number of conflicts
and complex emergencies, such as Somalia,
Rwanda and Kosovo. The increasing
Figure 2
Global food-aid deliveries, 1990–2000
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emergency demands, in the context of lower
food-aid availability, led to declines in food
aid used for economic development.
Sold and distributed food aid
As mentioned before, market-delivered food
aid encompasses not only programme food
aid, but also project food aid (and in some
cases
emer-
gency
food
aid). It
there-
fore
makes
sense to
classify
food aid
as sold or distributed, to clarify what pro-
portion of global food aid reaches benefici-
aries directly (Table 4, Figure 4).
Market-delivered food aid fluctuated
more widely in the 1990s than food aid
distributed to beneficiaries.3 Up to 1993, a
                                                
3 It should be noted that ‘distributed’ food aid does
not refer only to ‘donated’ or ‘free’ food to benefici-
higher proportion of global
food-aid deliveries was
sold, while in 1994–8,
distributed exceeded mar-
ket-delivered food aid. This
classification shows that
food aid, in an average of
about 50 per cent of cases,
is sold on the market and
does not reach the poorest
directly.
Since the usual clas-
sification of food aid erro-
neously assumes that mar-
ket-delivered food aid
consists only of pro-
gramme food aid, what is
then the relationship be-
tween programme food aid
and market-delivered food
aid? In other words, what proportion of to-
tal food aid beyond programme food aid is
likewise sold, although the fact is somehow
concealed in the international statistics?
This can be answered by comparing pro-
gramme food aid with the more general
term of market-delivered food aid (Table 5).
                                                                         
aries. Food-for-work programmes or school feeding
programmes are also distributed, whilst requiring
some kind of ‘repayment’: performing public works
or attending school, respectively. On the other hand,
it is the purpose of this chapter to show that if food
aid is market-delivered/monetized or sold (the terms
are used here synonymously), it is not just pro-
gramme food aid, but project food aid (and some-
times emergency operations as well). In other words,
the question of whether food aid is sold on the mar-
ket or distributed among beneficiaries is not an-
swered by the traditional programme, project and
Figure 3
Food-aid deliveries by type of programme
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Emergency
Project
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Source: WFP INTERFAIS
Table 4
Market-delivered (sold) and distributed food aid, ’000 t and percentage of total
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Distributed:
 Volume 5142 6053 7550 6703 7105 5743 4257 5154 4927 6634 7686
 Proportion 39 48 49 39 55 56 59 70 59 44 68
Sold:
 Volume 8007 6668 7750 10630 5820 4460 2971 2167 3447 8350 3652
 Proportion 61 52 51 61 45 44 41 30 41 56 32
Source: WFP INTERFAIS
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Table 5
Proportions of programme and market-
delivered food aid
(% of total)
Programme Sold
1990 0.64 0.61
1991 0.52 0.52
1992 0.5 0.51
1993 0.61 0.61
1994 0.44 0.45
1995 0.41 0.44
1996 0.4 0.41
1997 0.24 0.3
1998 0.34 0.41
1999 0.54 0.56
2000 0.28 0.32
Source: WFP INTERFAIS
Figure 5 reveals an interesting trend:
programme food aid and monetized food
aid were more or less equal in volume up
to 1994. The proportion of project and
emergency operations sold on the market
was not significant; so that market-
delivered food aid was practically syn-
onymous with programme food aid. How-
ever, after the Uruguay Round in 1994,
the gap between monetized and pro-
gramme food aid widened and market-
delivered food aid has exceeded pro-
gramme food aid ever since. This means
that a higher proportion of project (or
emergency) food aid, originally seen as
‘distributed’, is being sold on the open mar-
                                                                         
emergency classification.
ket, mainly by NGOs, which monetize it to
obtain cash to support their operations.
The causes of this trend are un-
clear. NGOs have always been allowed to
sell (monetize) food aid to generate cash
for their operations; why did they start to
sell a higher proportion of mainly project
food aid after 1994? The following hypo-
thetical explanations should be considered:
* Cash for the support of food-aid pro-
grammes declined after 1994, forcing
NGOs to sell a higher proportion of food
aid on the market.
* Increasingly fluctuation of agricultural
prices after 1994 encouraged NGOs to sell
instead of distribute commodities when
prices were high.
* Programme food aid was being ‘con-
verted into’ or ‘concealed as’ monetized
project food aid. There has always been
strong criticism of programme food aid,
which should ideally tend to decline un-
der an increasingly liberal system inter-
national agricultural trade. Monetized
project food aid is little different from
programme food aid. Indeed, the strong-
est similarity between them is that both
are sold on the open market at prevailing
market prices. Theoretically, monetized
Figure 5
Proportions of programme and market-delivered food aid
(% of total)
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project food aid could or should be con-
sidered programme food aid. Since it is
not, it is possible for programme food aid
to decrease whilst overall monetized food
aid does not, because the difference will
be ‘hidden’ as monetized project food
aid.
These possibilities are only part of a
general explanation of these trends. Further
research is needed to obtain a clearer pic-
ture of the various causes.
Major donors of food aid
The top three donors of food aid were the
United States, the European Commu-
nity/European Union, and Japan, which
provided 70–84 per cent of global food aid
in the 1990s. It should be noted that the EU
contribution came both from the organiza-
tion as such and from its separate member
countries.
This high concentration shows how
dependent food aid is on a few exporter
countries. Food aid is not an ‘international’
institution determined by the international
community or the United Nations. It de-
pends on the goodwill of a few countries.
Further questions about the future of food
aid arise because these countries are the
ones liberalizing their agricultural sectors
most rapidly.
Food aid and world agricultural trade
The decision at the 1994 Uruguay Round to
liberalize the world agricultural trade sys-
tem has had an impact on world cereal im-
ports and exports. The following table and
graph show that after 1994 world cereal
exports have been constantly above cereal
imports and that net exports have been
positive.
Food aid can be considered as an im-
plicit export subsidy to the donor country. It
has been seen in the last chapter that a
comprehensive definition of food aid makes
it possible to consider various commercial
transactions as food aid ‘if need be.’ As food
aid, theoretically driven by humanitarian
motivations, enjoys preferential treatment
under WTO rules, it seems reasonable to
assume that in certain cases, there is a
strong incentive to categorize particular
Table 6
Major donors to food-aid programmes
(1990–2000, ’000 t)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
USA 7831 7348 7549 10945 7186 4216 3147 3224 3995 9610 7016
EU 2274 1868 3800 3068 2306 2850 1473 1165 1173 2503 766
Japan 476 413 451 415 312 882 458 323 1173 402 630
Sum of above 10581 9629 11800 14428 9804 7948 5078 4712 6341 12515 8412
Total food aid 13151 12719 15302 17334 12926 10203 7228 7322 8375 14985 11339
Proportion 0.80 0.76 0.77 0.83 0.76 0.78 0.70 0.64 0.76 0.84 0.74
Source: WFP INTERFAIS.
Table 7
World cereal imports and exports
(1990–2000, ’000 t)
Imports Exports
1990 223,138 226,234
1991 229,626 234,202
1992 259,588 255,188
1993 234,339 235,518
1994 227,713 234,259
1995 245,953 250,692
1996 243,297 239,472
1997 241,022 247,815
1998 245,136 256,373
1999 260,813 265,599
2000 263,59 271,478
Source: FAOSTAT
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commercial transactions as food aid. It is
therefore interesting to see how food aid
relates to world agricultural trade. Figure 6
shows the relationship between food-aid
flows and world net cereal exports.
There were three main trends in the
1990s (Figure 7). The average of net agri-
cultural exports and food aid – (net exports
+ food aid)/2 – was more or
less constant until 1994,
meaning that food aid suc-
cessfully substituted for de-
creasing net exports. In
1996–8, the fall in net ex-
ports, although no more sig-
nificant than in 1993, was
not compensated for by in-
creasing food-aid donations,
so that the average of net ex-
ports and food aid decreased
sharply. This trend seemed to
be reversed after 1998, with
the average returning to its
pre-1996 level and food-aid
donations again cancelling
out the decreasing net ex-
ports. Time will tell to what
extent the trend will be sta-
ble in the longer term.
Food aid is clearly but a small propor-
tion of world agricultural trade, and despite
increases in food-aid levels after 1997, it
plays a relatively small role in world grain
markets. Food aid in grains amounted to
almost 18 per cent of world grain trade in
the mid-1960s, 10 per cent in
the early 1970s, and only 4–6
per cent in the 1990s (Chris-
tensen, 2000). Food aid cur-
rently constitutes only 4–6 per
cent of Official Development
Assistance (ODA, i.e. total aid to
developing countries).
The institution of food aid
is probably one of the most
controversial parts of the Uru-
guay Round agreements. Under
a liberalized agricultural trade
system, where all kinds of agri-
cultural subsidies and trade-
protection measures are re-
stricted and then removed, the
broadly defined institution of
food aid with all its flexibility
(especially programme food aid,
which differs little from commercial trans-
actions) does not seem to fit into the long-
term picture. If agricultural trade and pro-
duction are required to correspond to short-
Figure 6
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Figure 7
Global food aid and world net cereal exports
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term fluctuations in supply and demand,
and all distortions, barriers, subsidies and
preferential agreements in agricultural
trade are being phased out, food aid for de-
velopment becomes harder to justify on
humanitarian grounds. Why give pro-
gramme food aid and provide preferential
food imports to a developing country when
the global aim is to liberalize agricultural
trade to make it ‘freer’ and ‘fairer’? Why
give aid for development in kind instead of
financing development with cash, when the
cost-efficiency of food aid is clearly low? It
has been clear since the first food-aid pro-
grammes started in the 1950s that food aid,
as only a small proportion of world trade
and a temporary resource, doubly tied and
determined by donor preferences and po-
litical motives, can never be a long-term,
permanent way of providing food security
in developing countries. The future of food
aid is also questioned by its shrinking role
since the Uruguay Round and its seeming
incompatibility with the concept of liberal-
ized agricultural trade.
2) FOOD SECURITY, UN-
DERNOURISHMENT AND LONG-
TERM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
There has been much inconclusive debate
over the years about how widespread global
undernourishment is and how many people
are chronically hungry. This chapter sets
out to introduce briefly the two major data-
bases for estimating the number of under-
nourished and to point out the unreliability
of such estimates, which are widely used
and analysed because they are the only es-
timates available.
The two macro databases are pro-
duced by two UN agencies: the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the
World Health Organization (WHO). They
derive from quite different methodologies.
The FAO database rests on per capita calorie
availability on a country level, which is ul-
timately derived from food balance sheets
and so related to national food production
and availability. The WHO uses anthropo-
metric surveys to monitor worldwide un-
dernourishment, focusing on the relation-
ship of weight and height with age, but the
latter is restricted to monitoring children
under the age of five. The two estimates
differ substantially. According to the FAO,
undernourishment is most prevalent in Sub-
Saharan Africa, whilst the WHO finds South
Asia more severely undernourished.
The following sections analyse both
methods and address some criticisms of
them. It is important to note that the FAO
model is being used to monitor progress to-
wards one of the Millennium Development
Goals: the target of the 1996 World Food
Summit in Rome, of reducing by half the
absolute number of undernourished by the
year 2015.
The FAO model
The Sixth World Food Survey, published by
the FAO in 1996,4 introduced several modi-
fications of the methodology applied laid
down in the Fifth Survey, reviewing world
food situation up to the 1980s. In the most
up-to-date assessment of the worldwide
prevalence of undernourishment, the latest
period assessed was 1990–92, but pattern
comparisons were made with 1969–71 and
1979–81. It revealed a substantial decline
in the absolute number of undernourished
in the world, from 918 million in 1970 and
906 million in 1980, to 841 million in
1990.
                                                
4 The following have been conducted by the FAO
since World War II: 1946 World Food Survey (Brit-
ish Library), 1952 Second WFS, 1963 Third WFS,
1977 Fourth WFS, 1987 Fifth WFS, 1996 Sixth WFS
(LSE library).
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General description
The FAO method is based on three main
parameters, derived from three different
sets of data:
* The number of calories
per capita available for
human consumption on
a national level
(NPCCA).
* The coefficient of
variation for the avail-
able calories across
households (CV).
* The lowest acceptable per capita calorie
intake or calorie cut-off point below
which a household counts as under-
nourished (CCOP).
The NPCCA is derived from national
food-production data (based on the Food
Balance Sheets produced by the FAO) and
from net trade estimates, through a long
series of conversions to obtain the calorie
content of food supplies. The conversions
allow for waste, seed, food used for indus-
trial purposes, etc.
The CV represents the inter-household
food (calorie) distribution, but it does not
take into account the intra-household dis-
tribution of food. To estimate the distribu-
tion of food among households, FAO classi-
fies countries into five main categories (A,
B, C, D, E) depending on the availability of
data (Table 8). The two sources of data for
estimating the CV are, in order of impor-
tance, household income/expenditure sur-
veys (Groups A and B), containing informa-
tion about ‘energy intake’ of household
members, and calorie-income elasticities
(Groups C and D), used to estimate food
distribution in countries for which no sur-
vey data is available. The distinction be-
tween Groups A and B rests on whether the
data are available for the individual house-
holds (A) or just for groups of them (B).
With Groups C and D, the distribution of
food is directly related to income distribu-
tion. For the last group of countries (E), no
information is available about inter-
household food distribution. The food-
balance sheets are available for all coun-
tries, but these do not show anything about
the distribution of calories.
The estimation of CCOP rests on two
indicators: the Basal Metabolic Rate (BMR),
which is the minimum calorie expenditure
for internal body functions (in other words,
for survival), and the Body Mass Index
(BMI, = weight/(height)2), which is the
minimum acceptable body weight for
height.5 This norm for individuals is subse-
quently aggregated to the household per
capita norm or CCOP, which is eventually
taken as the national average.
Figure 8 shows the relationship be-
tween the three parameters; with the
hatched area under the CCOP showing the
proportion of undernourished.
                                                
5 From the first indicator, the minimum acceptable
calorie requirement is set by the FAO at 55 per cent
higher than the person’s BMR, allowing for extra
physical activity. As with the Body Mass Index, the
norm of ‘minimum calorie requirements’ for indi-
viduals of different ages and sexes is determined by
the lowest body weight and physical activity level
consistent with health. The FAO minimum weights
are derived from a body mass index of 18.5, with
which many nutritionists agree.
Table 8
FAO classification of countries based on available data of calorie dis-
tribution
A B C D E
Availability of energy-intake data Yes Groups only No No No
Availability of food-expenditure data Yes Yes Yes No No
Total income/expenditure data Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Food balance sheet Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: FAO, 1996.
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Criticism and unreliability of the FAO
method
The FAO model has long been criticized for
inaccuracy, based on two arguments: first,
the data for each of the parameters are
‘dangerously weak’,6 and secondly, the re-
lationship between the coefficients leaves
plenty of leeway for manipulating the final
estimates of the prevalence of undernour-
ishment.
Probably one of the most equivocal
numbers in the estimation process and defi-
nitely the least reliable estimates for Sub-
Saharan African countries are the agricul-
tural production data. These have been
gauged to have a margin of error of 15–40
per cent in previous studies (Svedberg,
1999). This is mainly because subsistence
production dominates in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica and the number of minor crops is usu-
ally large. Furthermore, the estimation
methods used are primitive (mainly ocular
observations) and not all parts of all Sub-
Saharan African countries are covered. The
region’s food-trade estimates are also unre-
liable.
                                                
6 This Leroy Quance, former director of the Statistical
Division of the FAO, conceded in an unpublished
report (according to Svedberg).
The estimate of the coefficient
of variation in Sub-Saharan Africa
is based on only two household-
expenditure surveys (conducted in
Kenya and Zambia) produced by
the IFPRI. These involved non-
random samples of 400 house-
holds, so that they are unrepresen-
tative of the whole of Sub-Saharan
Africa. Furthermore, they produced
different results (in Kenya, CV =
0.17, and in Zambia CV = 0.37).
Based on these two surveys, the
FAO chose a CV of 0.30 for the
whole of Sub-Saharan Africa.
There are serious problems
both with the calorie cut-off point
estimates as well – the Basal Metabolic Rate
and the Body Mass Index. The BMR until
about ten years ago was believed to be the
same for people of all races. It has turned
out more recently that people in ‘tropical’
countries have a lower BMR than Cauca-
sians (according to some studies 10 per cent
lower). The FAO uses the Caucasian BMR as
a norm, which consequently raises the esti-
mate of undernourished in the world. (With
a BMR norm 10 per cent lower, it would be
only 650 million, whilst the official FAO
estimate is 841 million.) With the Body
Mass Index, the main criticism focuses on
the variability of exogenous parameters
(e.g. illness), which influence body weight
but are not included in the FAO model.
These parameters make the estimates far
less reliable.
Apart from the problems with the data
on which the model is based, there are seri-
ous methodological errors in the model.
Other factors being equal, a lower CCOP
will mean a lower prevalence of under-
nourishment and a smaller NPCCA (a shift
of the entire distribution to the left), which
will imply a higher percentage of under-
nourishment. However, the change in the
CV is less clear. This is apparent in Figure 9,
where a more uneven CV2 distribution is
added to the model.
It seems that the change in the coeffi-
cient of variation (CV2) does not determine
Figure 8
The basic FAO model: the NPCCA, CV and CCOP parameters
CV1
Distribution
CCOP1   CCOP1   NPCCA
Source: FAO, 1996.
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clearly, other things being equal, whether
or not the prevalence of undernourishment
will increase. This depends on the size of the
two areas in the graph (areas a and b),
which show the difference between the es-
timated number of undernourished ac-
cording to the two distributions. It is possi-
ble that a more dispersed distribution (CV2)
area b will be larger compared with a, im-
plying a higher number of undernourished
than CV1 would estimate (other factors be-
ing equal), whereas a distribution with a
smaller variance may make a bigger than b,
recording a lower prevalence of under-
nourished for CV2 than for CV1. Thus the
effect on the number of undernourished
from change in the variation of the distri-
bution cannot be revealed a priori.
Sensitivity analysis of the parameters
reveals (Svedberg, 1999) that changing
CCOP and NPCCA by plus/minus 10 per
cent and CV by plus/minus 5 per cent can
alter the prevalence of undernourishment
by 21–61 per cent around the FAO estimate
of 43 per cent for Sub-Saharan Africa. This
underlines how unreliable the FAO esti-
mates are.
Anthropometric measure-
ment: the WHO approach
The WHO methodology for as-
sessing the prevalence of un-
dernourishment among chil-
dren under the age of five ap-
plies anthropometric indicators
instead of the food production
and distribution among house-
holds used by the FAO. The
main features of this approach
are the following:
* Wasting (low weight for
height) indicates a process of weight loss
that may be associated with acute star-
vation or chronic unfavourable condi-
tion. The prevalence under ‘normal cir-
cumstances’ is below 5 per cent and
scores of 10–15 per cent are regarded as
serious on the severity index.
* Stunting (low height for age) reflects a
process of failure to reach linear growth
potential. For the children under the age
2-3 low height for age reflects a con-
tinuing process (failing to grow) whereas
for older children it reflects a state of
‘having failed to grow’. Stunting, as op-
posed to wasting, represents chronic
starvation.
* Underweight (low weight for age) re-
flects body mass relative to chronological
age. One disadvantage of this indicator is
that it fails to distinguish between short
children of adequate body weight and
tall, thin children. Usually, a reduction in
weight for age reveals change in weight
for height.
It may happen that one of the indica-
tors does not show evidence of undernour-
ishment, whereas another one shows an
alarming situation.
Figure 9
Various CV parameters in the FAO model
CV1
Distribution
CCOP1   NPCCA
CV2
a
b
c
Source: Svedberg (1999).
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General description
The WHO set up the Global Database on
Child Growth and Malnutrition in 1986, as
a compilation of child growth and malnu-
trition data from over 1700 surveys con-
ducted since 1960. According to the WHO
website, ‘Growth assessment… provides an
indirect measurement of quality of life of
the entire population.’
To compare data of undernourish-
ment among countries, there is a need for
an adequately fed control population to
provide an acceptable set of reference val-
ues. The idea behind such a reference
population is the assumption that growth
patterns of pre-school children from differ-
ent ethnic backgrounds are very similar.
The WHO adopted in the late 1970s the ref-
erence curves of the National Centre for
Health Statistics (NCHS). These are based on
two distinct data sets: the Ohio Fels Re-
search Institute Longitudinal Study on chil-
dren under the age of two (1929–75) and
three cross-sectional representative US sur-
veys (1960–75) for older children.
The standard Z-score7 is widely rec-
ognized as the best measure for making a
population-based assessment system for
analysis. It is calculated as:
The anthropometric value is expressed
as a number of standard deviations below or
above the reference median value, so that a
fixed Z-score interval (independent of sex)
implies a fixed height (cm) or weight (kg)
difference for children of a specific age. The
central 95 per cent of the distribution is re-
garded as the ‘normal’ range, and the lower
                                                
7 The two other indicators besides the Z-score, by
which a child can be compared to the reference
population, are percentiles and percentage of me-
dian.
cut-off points of (–2) SD or (–3) SD classify
as moderately or severely undernourished
respectively.
The big advantage of the Z-score sys-
tem is that a group of Z-scores can be sub-
jected to summary statistics such as the
mean and the standard deviation, so that the
nutritional status of the entire population
can be described. A mean Z-score is calcu-
lated, and if its value is significantly lower
than zero (the expected value for the refer-
ence distribution), it means that most indi-
viduals have been affected.
Criticisms of the WHO approach
The main criticism of the WHO approach
questions the origin and type of data used
for the construction of the reference curves
and the analytical methods applied in de-
riving them.
It is frequently objected that the two
sets of data comprising the reference curve
are not derived by the same method.
Younger children are measured supine
(length) and older children standing
(height), giving a marked discrepancy in
estimated height immediately before and
after 24 months of age, where the two
curves ideally should merge. Another criti-
cism is that the WHO approach focuses only
on severely malnourished children. This
will be insufficient to improve child survival
globally and inadequate in addressing mal-
nutrition’s toll on human de-
velopment. The most significant
impact, critics argue, can be
expected when all grades of
malnutrition are targeted. A
high prevalence of anthropometric deficit in
a population will show up in severe health
and nutritional problems, but the risk is not
confined to individuals below the cut-off
point, which should be used only to facili-
tate applying the indicator. Even children
not below conventional cut-off points for
defining malnutrition are at increased risk
population reference the ofdeviation standard  (SD)
)population reference the of uemedian val–  value(observed  score-Z =
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and should be taken into account in inter-
vention programmes.
A recommendation stating that a new
growth reference was needed urgently to
enhance the nutritional management of in-
fants was endorsed in 1994 by the World
Health Assembly (resolution WHA47.5). An
international effort is currently under way
to develop such a reference.
Comparison of the two models
There is a remarkable difference between
the results of the two calculation methods.
According to the FAO, undernourishment is
highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, while the
WHO finds that the food situation is worst
in South Asia. Table 9 shows the difference
between the two estimates.
Table 9
Prevalence of undernourishment according to
various indicators
(per cent)
Sub-Saharan
Africa South Asia
FAO proportion of house-
holds undernourished 43 22
WHO proportion of
young children stunted 38 60
WHO proportion of
young children under-
nourished
30 58
Source: Svedberg, 1999.
Although Svedberg (1999) estimated
the margin of error of the FAO method at
21–61 percent, it may be much higher than
that. The three pillars of the method are of
extremely dubious origin. To recapitulate,
the food balance sheets may not reflect real
agricultural output, the calorie conversion
rates for food products have a wide range of
flexibility, the coefficient of variation (food
distribution) seems to be guesswork based
on only two household surveys from Sub-
Saharan Africa, and the estimation process
of the calorie cut-off points is debated due
to problems with the Basal Metabolic Rate
and the Body Mass Index. Integrating all
these parameters into a single model does
not seem to give a reliable prevalence for
undernourishment at all.
On the other hand, there are serious
problems with anthropometric measure-
ments as well. The usual problems with sur-
veys are applicable (questions of sampling
and how representative it is) and it is also
clear that alarming anthropometric indica-
tors are a combination of several factors, of
which food intake is only one. Health facili-
ties, food quality etc. may also play a crucial
role in this respect.
Although all too little is known about
the prevalence of worldwide undernour-
ishment, the FAO and WHO data sets are
widely used and quoted. What is more, the
international target of reducing the absolute
number of the undernourished by 2015 is
being monitored with the FAO model.
When trying to compare food aid with un-
dernourishment, the margin of error is in-
evitably high. Before turning our attention
to analysing the problem of food aid and
food security, it is worth outlining the goals
of the 1996 World Food Summit.
The World Food Summit plan of ac-
tion
The heads of state participating in the
World Food Summit held under the aus-
pices of the FAO in 1996 made a specific
political pledge to reduce the number of
undernourished by 2015. For the base pe-
riod, 1991–2 was chosen, with the FAO
model as the monitor for progress.
Table 10 shows that to achieve the re-
quired decrease in the absolute number of
undernourished by 2015, taking into ac-
count the high population growth in devel-
oping countries, the share of undernour-
ished would have to fall by more than half,
from 20 per cent in 1991 to 7 per cent in
2015.
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According to the
UN target, there should
in absolute terms be only
420 million undernour-
ished by 2015 (7 per
cent of the world popu-
lation). Between 1992
and 1997, the annual
average fall in the num-
ber of undernourished
was 6 million, but to
reach the 2015 target, this annual decrease
would have to rise to 22 million, which
means accelerating the pace significantly.
As acknowledged by the State of Food Inse-
curity in the World (FAO, 2002), the re-
quired reduction will not be achieved by
2015 if current trends continue (Figure 10).
Broken down
by regions, Table 11
presents a different
picture.
Over the past
30 years, Sub-
Saharan Africa has
clearly been the only
region where the
proportion of under-
nourished has in-
creased and is still
growing in absolute
and relative terms. If
current trends con-
tinue, there will be
350 million under-
nourished people in
Sub-Saharan Africa
alone by 2015.8
South Asia seems to
be ‘doing well’ if
trends since 1979
continue, but any
return to the trends
before 1979 would
jeopardize develop-
ment. The future of
the region in terms of
undernourishment is
                                                
8 However, this is true only according to the FAO
estimates. Anthropometric measurements, as noted
earlier, present a picture in which undernourish-
ment is higher in South East Asia. This boils down to
the question of which model is more appropriate and
should be used to monitor the World Food Summit
target.
Table 10
Changes in the proportion and absolute number of undernourished according
to the FAO model and estimates for the UN target year 2015
1969–71 1990–92 1997–9 2015
Proportion of under-
nourished (%) 35 20 (18) 7
Absolute number of
world undernourished 918 million 841 million 815 million 420 million
Total population in
developing countries 2623 million 4100 million* 4500 million 6000 million*
Note: * (4,100 million) x (1.015)25 = (4,100 million) x 1.451 = 5,949 million
Source: Various FAO publications and own calculations.
Figure 10
Progress towards the World Food Summit target: current trends and the
required pace of reduction
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Table 11
Undernourishment in different regions of the world
(1969–1990)
1969/71 1979/81 1990/92
Country region
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Sub-Saharan Africa 130 38 148 41 215 43
South Asia 238 33 303 34 255 22
East and Southeast Asia 476 41 379 27 269 16
Latin America and the Caribbean 53 19 48 14 64 15
Near East/North Africa 48 27 27 12 37 12
Total 918 35 906 28 841 20
Source: FAO 1996a
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greatly determined by the developments in a
single country, India. The other regions
have also been ‘performing well’, according
to the model, and only a continuation of
current trends is necessary to meet the
2015 targets. The East–Southeast Asian re-
gion is also determined by the progress in a
single country, China.
It is important to keep in mind that
these estimates refer to the chronically un-
dernourished, those who theoretically con-
sume less than the required calories every
day, so that the model and estimates are
valid only if other things are equal. The es-
timates are implicitly based on an ‘equilib-
rium’ model that only changes over time.
The food balance estimates are based on
three-year averages that do not reflect
short-term fluctuations in production (pro-
duction shocks) or in population (epidem-
ics, mass starvation, wars). In fact, beyond
the chronically undernourished, there is a
strongly fluctuating seasonal, short-term or
acute hunger that the model does not cap-
ture by definition. The number of these
people may rise substantially over time,
whilst the model still shows an improve-
ment. Whether or not the ceteris paribus
assumption of the model is reasonable is
open to question.
The next chapter places food aid in
the model, by investigating what role food
aid can play in reducing the number of un-
dernourished in the world.
3) FOOD AID FOR FOOD SE-
CURITY?
The prime justification for giving food aid to
a developing country is always humanitar-
ian in some respect: to provide relief in an
emergency, to help the destitute in a ‘nor-
mal’ situation, or to reduce undernourish-
ment and so contribute ultimately to the
Millennium Development Goals. It has been
seen in the first chapter that emergency op-
erations increased in the late 1990s without
wide fluctuations. Project food aid was also
more or less stable and the overall variabil-
ity in global food aid was triggered by pro-
gramme food aid sold on the market, not
reaching beneficiaries directly. Programme
food aid may have indirect food-security
effects by depressing prices in times of
soaring demand coupled with scarce local
supply. The argument runs that the poorest
(mainly wage labourers who obtain their
food needs on the market) will then be able
to buy essential commodities at lower
prices. A counter-argument could be that a
high proportion of the rural population in
developing countries is involved in agri-
cultural production – subsistence farming
mixed with cash cropping – and depressed
agricultural prices may worsen their situa-
tion by decreasing the revenue they obtain
from the market for their produce.
Since the first food-aid deliveries in
the 1950s, there have been concerns about
the food-security effects of food-aid pro-
grammes and a huge literature has evolved
around the issue. Some of the trends in this
debate are summarized in the following
sections.
The debate on food aid
Until the 1980s, food aid constituted about
10-15 per cent of global official develop-
ment assistance (aid). The proportion today
is estimated to have fallen to about 4 per
cent. Despite the relative insignificance of
aid, the debate on its effectiveness and im-
pact has attracted disproportionate atten-
tion. One reason is that food aid, for some of
the poorest countries, has been an essential
factor in foreign-exchange availability and
developmental investment resources. The
debate in the literature has concentrated on
the general economic effects of food aid on
prices and production, on commercial dis-
placement, labour markets, local consump-
tion patterns, etc.
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The economic effects
Maxwell and Singer (1979) identified four
positive and four negative aspects of food
aid. This classification still provides a useful
analytical framework for investigating the
effects of food aid on economic develop-
ment. Of the arguments for food aid, the
most important are the output aspect (does
food aid affect aggregate output or foster
growth?), the distribution aspect (what are
the effects of supplementary feeding and
food-for-work projects on employment and
income distribution?), the stabilization as-
pect (how can food aid contribute to stabili-
zation policies?), and additionality aspect
(how far is food aid additional?). The cases
against food aid are the disincentive aspect
(what are the effects of food aid on local
prices, production, government policy and
on the labour market?), the allocation as-
pect (which countries receive food aid and
when?), the dependency aspect (do recipi-
ents of food aid become increasingly de-
pendent on donor countries?) and the infe-
riority aspect (food aid is expensive, double-
tied, dependent on surpluses, irregular,
bureaucratic and often inappropriate).
Instead of going into the arguments in
depth and evaluating the contradictory
findings of different studies about the gen-
eral effectiveness of food aid, Table 12
summarizes the concepts and highlights the
most important arguments for and against.
It should be noted that the discussion has
been mainly about development food aid,
which involves project aid (both monetized
and distributed) and programme food aid.
Emergency aid has not been subject to ma-
jor criticisms, or not to the same extent.
Based on the table and the discussion
on the economic effects of food aid, several
‘general’ conditions can be identified which
are regarded as necessary for food aid to
contribute to economic growth:
(1) Food aid should substitute for commercial
imports, so that it releases foreign ex-
change for investment goods. It should
also stabilize food supplies, to provide fa-
vourable conditions for growth.
(2) Food should be the binding constraint
on growth in the country concerned, so
that food aid can release pressure to
produce food crops for consumption,
and therefore land can be used more
profitably for the production of export
cash crops.
(3) The commodities delivered should be
part of the normal diet in the country
concerned. Food aid should contribute
to better nutrition of the population and
assist the formation of human capital.
(4) Food aid should be part of a broadly
based development plan and comple-
mented with other aid. It must be
planned in advance and resources gen-
erated from the sale of food aid must not
be tied to non-developmental uses.
Drawing general conclusions about
the effectiveness of providing aid in kind is
problematic: regions, countries and situa-
tions vary substantially, and any kind of
general guidance may be too broad to be
applied in a particular situation. The recog-
nition of this fact has drawn increasing at-
tention at the problem of targeting food aid.
Food aid and food security
What are the main requirements if food aid
is to contribute to food security and be used
in the ‘best and most efficient’ way? The
answer is simply that the food has to be
given to hungry people at the right time and
in the right place and quantity. However,
previous chapters have shown that the
problem is more complicated than that.
(1) There is the persistent problem of tar-
geting: How can we find the poorest and
ensure that the aid does not leak away to
relatively prosperous households or be-
25
Table 12
Discussion of the positive and negative effects of food aid on economic development
Issue Positive effects Negative effects
If development runs into a food constraint, food aid pro-
vides real resources and prevents excess demand, so con-
tributing to growth. Food aid can also contribute to
growth by releasing foreign exchange for investment
goods, relieving the need to produce food (freeing land
for more profitable crops), providing cheap inputs (feed
aid), improving nutrition of the workforce, and stabiliz-
ing food supplies.
Food is not always the binding constraint on growth. Food
aid can also substitute for domestic savings or be used to
increase consumption, so that it does not necessarily fos-
ter growth.
Output: does
food aid foster
growth?
Empirical investigation is needed before it can be said for certain what fiscal, investment, import and other policies
would have been in the absence of food aid that was received.
Food aid has positive distribution effects by enabling gov-
ernments to avoid squeezing agriculture and making it
possible to undertake specific poverty-focused feeding
programmes. Food-for-work programmes reach the poor
and contribute to income and employment. Wages in
kind guarantee additional consumption and nutritional
status is benefited.
Food aid also has negative distribution effects. It encour-
ages governments to maintain existing policies of capital-
intensive industrialization. It diverts investment in grain
storage from villages to big harbours. Development proj-
ects are biased towards developed, accessible areas. Pub-
lic-works programmes worsen the distribution of assets
and the number of long-term jobs created is often disap-
pointing. Paying wages in kind is expensive, inconven-
ient, conducive to low productivity, and unpopular
among workers, who often sell on food wages at a dis-
count.
Distribution:
employment
and income
distribution.
The effect of
supplementary
feeding pro-
grammes and
food-for-work
programmes.
Less than one-third of food aid is used to support poverty-focused projects through direct distribution. The debate is
inappropriate because distribution effects are more likely to occur through market sales of food aid, including con-
cessionary sales through ‘fair-price’ shops.
Storage and stabilization schemes contribute to long-term
welfare by funding village-level store construction and
establishing international buffer-stock arrangements.
Planned stabilization schemes often succumb to pressures
of rising demand and administrative complexity.
Contribution to
stabilization
programmes.
A potential exists for food aid to contribute to stabilization policies, but it has yet to be realized.
Food aid is additional and does not disrupt commercial
imports. The ‘usual marketing requirements’ are main-
tained.
Developing countries benefit most from food aid when it
substitutes for commercial purchases, so that it frees re-
sources for imports of investment goods.
Additionality
No one can be sure what import policies would have been pursued in the absence of food aid. It is thought that be-
tween half and three-quarters of the aid has acted as a substitute for commercial imports.
Benefits of high food prices in times of inflation often go
to traders, not farmers, and food prices reach the long-
term levels required to attract sufficient investment.
Where a recipient country faces a food constraint on
development and serious inflationary pressure, provision
of food aid helps to curb inflation. The perfect market
implicit in the counter-argument is not present in reality.
Rural works can have a beneficial effect by competing for
labour and driving wages up towards minimum stan-
dards.
If food aid is sold on the market, food prices fall below
what they would have been and farmers produce less
food than they otherwise would. Government investment
in agriculture falls, regulation of grain marketing be-
comes inefficient, and technical assistance to producers
decreases. Agricultural labour is attracted away from
normal employment and the consequence is a decline in
output.
Disincentives:
changes in
prices, food
production and
government
attitudes.
The disincentive effect on food production can be negligible and it is necessary therefore to resort to empirical tests.
India and Bangladesh have been the largest recipients of
food aid.
Humanitarian arguments for appropriations are not re-
flected in the allocation of food aid between countries. US
food aid has been used to provide extra-budgetary mili-
tary assistance to recipient countries.
Allocation as-
pect: who re-
ceives food aid?
For donors conditions may differ, but there seems to be little targeting of food aid towards food-insecure countries.
Greater food imports may not be undesirable, especially if
the land released from domestic food production is used
productively for export cash crops. Transnationalization
is not ‘bad’ in itself.
Increasing dependency on food imports, selling food aid
as a source of revenue and conditions imposed on the use
of counterpart funds create dependency on the donor.
Deeper penetration by foreign capital leads to economic
dependency. Food aid can be a vehicle for transnationali-
zation because corporations benefit at the expense of
developing countries: they are paid to process and pack
food aid commodities.
Dependency
There are a few case studies to test these alternative hypotheses against individual country experience, but most of
them are ambivalent in their findings.
Food aid is not cost-ineffective in regions where there is
lack of food, where food is not available. In these regions,
aid provided in kind is superior to cash.
Food aid is inferior to cash and reduces freedom of
choice. It is also expensive: US and EU prices are above
world-market prices; US shipping is expensive. Food aid
is dependent on surpluses and thus irregular, and com-
posed of inappropriate, exotic products that are hard to
dispose of. It is also bureaucratic and logistically difficult.
Inferiority
The opportunity cost of resources invested in handling food aid is particularly high. The administrative heaviness of
food aid and the associated expense are recurring themes in food-aid literature.
Source: Summary of various articles.
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come lost in the bureaucracy sur-
rounding distribution? The neediest
people are scattered around the country,
not grouped in one area. Both self-
targeting and administrative targeting
have inefficiency-inducing effects.
(2) It has been pointed out already that in-
jecting food aid into local markets will
have various economic effects (positive
or negative) on various segments of the
population. No general conclusion can
be reached about whether food aid is
‘good’ or ‘bad’. Moreover, food aid is
dwarfed by commercial imports (into
most countries), so that it is questionable
whether it has an overall effect on food
security. Be that as it may, a better way
of financing and addressing national
food security could presumably be
found.
(3) Then comes the in cash/in kind di-
lemma. Why supply aid in kind (food)?
The argument against financing devel-
opment in kind (transport, handling,
organization) is its high cost, and food
aid is certainly cost-inefficient.
(4) Food aid is obviously a temporary resort,
a resource that is soon consumed. So
how can food aid as such affect a coun-
try’s longer-term food security? It could
be argued that this can be done by fi-
nancing long-term development, which
ultimately contributes to people’s well-
being and indirectly their food security.
On the other hand, if a specific devel-
opment project had been financed in
cash, which is more cost-efficient, the
same result could have been achieved
with a smaller investment at lower cost.
(5) Finally, the commodities provided under
a food-aid programme are tied – deter-
mined by the donor – which restricts the
recipient in choosing appropriate com-
modities. For example, if the type of food
aid provided does not feature in the lo-
cal diet and food habits, the food-
security aspect of the programme be-
comes problematic again.
How can the food-security aspect of
food aid be examined statistically. How can
it be determined numerically whether food
aid has had an effect on food security on the
macro level?
* The Food Aid Convention should be in-
vestigated as a possible way of providing
an effective safety net for developing
countries in times of high food prices.
* Most global food aid goes to quite a small
number of countries. Are the main re-
cipients the countries with the highest
proportion of undernourishment? Or
conversely, are the countries where un-
dernourishment is most prevalent re-
ceiving the highest proportion of food
aid?
The Food Aid Convention
The Food Aid Convention (FAC) is an inter-
national agreement whose signatories are
legally bound to provide specified minimum
tonnages of food aid in ‘wheat equivalent’.
The aim is to provide a guaranteed mini-
mum flow of food aid to developing coun-
tries and an effective safety net to protect
recipient countries from possible downward
fluctuations in annual shipments of food
aid.
Benson (2000) analysed the role of
the FAC in determining actual flows of food
aid. It was found that the floor levels for
food-aid flows set by the FAC were so low
that their impact on actual shipments was
negligible, globally and from international
donors. The study concluded that on only
two occasions in 30 years (in 1973–4 and
1996–7) had the FAC probably prevented a
steeper decline in food aid than actually oc-
curred. A comparison of the minimum
commitments and flows of food aid indi-
cated that, despite the FAC, annual global
flows had varied by up to 20–25 per cent.
The FAC appeared to have done little to al-
leviate such wide fluctuations. Figure 11
shows that global cereal food aid decreased
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when world wheat prices increased, and
vice versa.
The fact that the FAC has been unable
to provide an effective safety net raises seri-
ous questions about its credibility as a
means of determining international com-
mitments to protect the food security of de-
veloping countries.
The main recipients of food aid
One requirement if food aid is to have a
food-security function on a macro, global
level is that it should be allocated to the
countries with the highest proportion of
undernourishment. Tables 13 and 14 show
that this was not the case in the 1990s. Ta-
ble 13 shows the countries with the highest
prevalence of undernourishment, whilst
Table 14 shows the ones that were the main
recipients of food aid in the 1990s. Ideally,
the two tables would show the same coun-
tries, but this is not the case.
The countries
with the highest pro-
portions of under-
nourishment were not
the biggest recipients
of food aid in the
1990s, as Figure 12
shows in graphic
form. Afghanistan and
Burundi, for example,
ranked second and
third in the FAO list of
countries with the
highest prevalence of
undernourishment,
but they received only
5 and 3 kg of food aid
per capita respec-
tively. (At the opposite
extreme, Cape Verde
received 123 kg per
capita in 2000. Such
‘explosions’ of food
aid are frequent in the
data.)
A comparison
of the two tables reveals that only three of
the countries with the highest proportions
of undernourishment feature among the top
ten recipients of food aid: Ethiopia, Korea
and Mozambique. The third most important
recipient of food aid in the 1990s was the
Russian Federation, where the proportion of
undernourishment was a rather low 6 per
cent, while, India, albeit with a surprisingly
low prevalence of undernourishment of 21
per cent, received virtually no food aid by
comparison with its population: 0.28 kg per
capita.
This rather simple analysis reveals
that the allocation of food aid on a macro
(country) level does not correspond with
the food-security situations of the recipient
or non-recipient countries. In addition, it
should be recalled that a high proportion of
food aid is not distributed among benefici-
aries, but sold on the market at prevailing
market prices. There is no direct food-
security effect of monetized food aid and its
positive indirect effects cannot be assured,
due to various unpredictable market effects.
Figure 11
Trends in global food aid in cereals and FAC minimum commitments
(1970–1998)
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Table 13
Average food aid to the ten countries with the highest proportions
 of undernourishment
(1990–2000)
Proportion of popula-
tion undernourished
in 1997
Average food
aid, 1990–99, t
Average food
aid per capita, t
Somalia 75 77,425 12
Afghanistan 70 108,587 5
Burundi 68 14,871 3
Eritrea 65 72,887 19
Haiti 62 115,423 14
Congo, Dem. Rep. 61 11,529 13
Mozambique 58 373,375 35
Korean PDR 57 401,644 17
Ethiopia 49 895,212 32
Liberia 46 124,423 39
Source: FAOSTAT CD 2000, and author’s calculations.
Table 14
 Top ten recipients of food aid in the 1990s
Proportion of popula-
tion undernourished in
1997
Average food
aid, 1990–99, t
Average food
aid per capita, t
Bangladesh 38 925,660 7
Ethiopia 49 895,212 13
Russian Federation 6 820,405 6
Egypt 4 439,228 6
Korean PDR 57 401,644 17
Mozambique 58 373,375 35
India 21 284,962 0.281
Sudan 18 265,655 9
Peru 18 246,881 10
Georgia 23 213,989 43
Source: FAOSTAT, 2000, and author’s calculations.
Figure 12
Top recipients of food aid:
BANGLADESH, RUSSIAN
FEDERATION, EGYPT, INDIA, SUDAN,
PERU, GEORGIA
Both:
MOZAMBIQUE, KOREA,
ETHIOPIA
Highest proportion of
undernourished:
SOMALIA, AFGHANISTAN, BURUNDI,
ERITREA, HAITI, CONGO, LIBERIA
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Quotations from inter-
national documents
The following quotations have been taken from
various recent international documents and
conventions. The purpose of this annex is to un-
derline the motivations of this paper and high-
light the shift in food-aid towards food security
which has been emphasized in these papers.
World Food Summit, 1996
(Commitment) We pledge our political will and
our common and national commitment to
achieving food security for all and to an ongo-
ing effort to eradicate hunger in all countries,
with an immediate view to reducing the num-
ber of undernourished people to half their pres-
ent level no later than 2015.
(Definition of food security) Food security exists
when all people, at all times, have physical and
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutri-
tious food to meet their dietary needs and food
preferences for an active and healthy life.
(The role of food-aid) Increased production,
including traditional crops and their products,
in efficient combination with food imports, re-
serves, and international trade can strengthen
food security and address regional disparities.
Food-aid is one of the many instruments which
can help to promote food security.
(Referring to food-aid) It is important to main-
tain an adequate capacity in the international
community to provide food-aid, whenever it is
required, in response to emergencies. Equitable
access to stable food supplies should be ensured.
Food-aid Convention, 1999
(Food-aid for food security) Food-aid […]
should be aimed at enhancing food security in
recipient countries. In responding to those
needs, members shall pay attention to meeting
the particular nutritional needs of women and
children.
When food-aid is sold within a recipient coun-
try, the sale shall be carried out, as far as possi-
ble, through the private sector and be based on
market analysis. In targeting proceeds from
such sales, priority shall be given to projects
aiming to improve the food security of benefici-
aries.
(Food-aid as grant) Food-aid under this Con-
vention provided in the form of grants shall
represent not less than 80 percent of a mem-
ber's contribution and, to the extent possible,
members will seek progressively to exceed this
percentage.
Council Regulation (EC) No 1292/96 of 27
June 1996 on food-aid policy and food-aid
management and special operations in support
of food security
(Food aid for food security) The objectives of the
food-aid operations […] shall […] be:
* to promote food security geared to alleviat-
ing poverty, to help the population of devel-
oping countries and regions, at household,
local, national and regional levels,
* to raise the standard of nutrition of the re-
cipient population and help it obtain a bal-
anced diet,
* to promote the availability and accessibility
of foodstuffs to the public.
When products are selected, consideration shall
be given […] to reaching the maximum number
of people.
(Targeting and measuring food aid) Food aid
[…] is the only way to improve the food security
of groups which do not have the means or pos-
sibility of plugging their food shortage them-
selves. To that end, consideration shall be given
to […]:
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* the food situation measures using human
development and nutritional indicators,
* per capita income and the existence of par-
ticularly poor population groups,
* social indicators of the welfare of the popu-
lation in question,
* the recipient country’s balance-of-payments
situation,
* the existence in the recipient country of a
long-term policy on food security.
USAID food aid and food security policy paper,
1995
(Food aid for food security) Greater priority in
allocating food aid will be given to countries
most in need of food. Under current world con-
ditions, those countries are primarily in Africa.
USAID will allocate resources and manage pro-
grams to increase the impact U.S. food aid has
in reducing hunger.
One of the obvious strengths of food aid is its
immediate application in feeding people – either
as part of a humanitarian relief effort, as part of
a recovery strategy or as part of a broader de-
velopment effort.
(Targeting and ‘measuring’ food aid) Perform-
ance monitoring and assessment systems will be
introduced to permit USAID and the PVOs to
demonstrate more clearly the food-security im-
pact of U.S. food aid programs.
Appendix 2. Selected definitions of
undernutrition
Mild malnutrition: sometimes called undernu-
trition, may not present any clinical or labora-
tory symptoms, although the affected individual
may suffer a loss of vitality and reduced ability
to function physically and mentally.
Undernutrition: Inadequate intake of one or
more nutrients and/or of calories. (The con-
verse ‘overnutrition’ is not a recommended
term.)
Chronic undernutrition refers to a long-term
inadequate food intake and is reflected by low
height-for-age levels. It was defined as a height-
for-age less than the fifth percentile of the Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics growth charts,
and acute undernutrition was defined as a
weight- for-height less than the fifth percentile.
Acute undernutrition refers to a short-term, se-
verely inadequate food intake and is reflected by
low weight-for-height levels. Weight-for-height
is the anthropometric index best correlated with
caloric nutriture. Low weight-for-height levels
(less than fifth percentile) are usually associated
with acute undernutrition, referred to techni-
cally as ‘wasting.’
Chronic undernutrition: Height-for-age is an
anthropometric indicator that associates con-
sistent adequate nutrition with normal growth.
Chronic undernutrition, especially during criti-
cal growth periods, results in the stunting of an
individual. Low height-for-age levels (less than
the fifth percentile) are associated with chronic
undernutrition.
Undernutrition: A form of malnutrition result-
ing from a deficit of nutrient availability in re-
lation to tissue needs. One of the signs of un-
dernutrition is inadequate growth in children.
Growth is judged relative to accepted growth
standards supplemented by a consideration of
genetic variables. Undernutrition is accompa-
nied by an excessive loss of lean body mass in
children and adults.
Undernutrition represents measurable changes
in nutritional status that result from a chronic
marginal deficit of food quality and/or quantity.
Although hunger increases the risk of under-
nutrition , hunger does not necessarily result in
a measurable impairment of nutritional status;
likewise, undernutrition can develop without
the occurrence of frank hunger.
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